Adaptive Game-based Agent Negotiation in Deregulated Energy Markets by Capodieci, Nicola et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Adaptive Game-based Agent Negotiation in Deregulated Energy Markets
Capodieci, Nicola; Cabri, Giacomo; Pagani, Giuliano Andrea; Aiello, Marco
Published in:
Workshop on Adaptive Collaboration (colocated with CTS 2012)
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2012
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Capodieci, N., Cabri, G., Pagani, G. A., & Aiello, M. (2012). Adaptive Game-based Agent Negotiation in
Deregulated Energy Markets. In Workshop on Adaptive Collaboration (colocated with CTS 2012) IEEE
(The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers).
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Adaptive Game-based Agent Negotiation in
Deregulated Energy Markets
Nicola Capodieci and Giacomo Cabri
Information Engineering Department
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Modena, Italy
{nicola.capodieci, giacomo.cabri}@unimore.it





Abstract—In the emerging deregulated energy paradigm en-
abled by the Smart Grid, energy provisioning will change dras-
tically. Energy contracts will be negotiated between a potential
multitude of parties at high frequency (e.g., several times per day)
based on local needs and micro-generation production facilities.
In this context, this paper presents an agent-based approach
to manage negotiation among the different parties. The goal of
the presented work is to propose adaptive negotiation strategies
for trading energy in a deregulated market. In particular, we
provide strategies derived from game theory, in order to optimize
energy production and supply costs by means of negotiation and
adaptation. The novelty lies in the adaptation of the class of
minority and stochastic games to the energy trading problem
in order to model the strategy of the various parties involved.
The paper presents also simulation results of a scenario with a
large number of energy buyers, a small set of prosumers (energy
consumers and producers using renewable micro-generation
facilities) and a few large-scale traditional electricity suppliers.
Keywords—Multi-Agent Systems; Energy; Market; Adaptation
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy market is rapidly changing: while once it was
based only on traditional big energy generating companies
(Gencos), which also had the monopoly on the transmission
and distribution services, now it is opening to a very high
and dynamic number of players. Most of these new players
can produce smaller quantity of energy, often derived from
renewable energy sources and they are all inserted in the
Smart Grid. Smart Grids are digital enabled nets of energy
consumers, suppliers and prosumers that are able to optimize
energy provisioning also by introducing a flexible approach
for short-term contract stipulation. A prosumer is a domestic
environment (therefore it is a consumer) provided with micro-
generation facilities, such as solar panels, small wind turbines,
combined heat-power generation. Its surplus energy production
may be sold to neighboring consumers (therefore it is also
a producer). Due to the market shift from long term energy
contracts to higher granularities, we see the need for adopting
an autonomous system able to represent the end user’s needs,
both for energy sellers and for buyers. In fact, the user can
hardly take care of her energy requests manually several
times a day while busy in everyday activities. Thanks to their
autonomy, software agents are one of the best candidates to
accomplish this task on behalf of users; a MAS (Multi Agent
System) can include buyer agents representing the ordinary
energy consumers, specific designed prosumer agents able to
contract for incoming/outgoing electric energy flow, and agents
acting on behalf of big energy producers. Every agent will
need to be instructed on the possible actions to take during the
negotiation rounds and they will have to learn how to adapt
to the market dynamics. Adaptivity is defined as a property
that enables participants of a system to sustain themselves in
such dynamic environments [1]: in our work, the participants
are the agents with their respective roles in an ever changing
electricity market. This paper focuses on the negotiation and
adaptation aspects: how can we instruct every single agent in
a MAS in order to achieve better priced contracts according
to the user’s expected budget? The two kinds of energy sellers
(Gencos and prosumers) adopt two different price strategies:
the former ones rely on a fixed but higher price, while the
latter ones can propose cheaper but changing prices. Even if
this makes the scenario extremely complex, we want to model
its negotiation in a simple way by reducing it to elementary
steps that we can link to specific topics of game theory. In
fact, the multitude of agents could represent a game with a
plurality of participants, while the high granularity of contracts
implies different negotiating rounds that can be linked to the
game theoretic concept of repeated game. An evaluation of
each negotiation enable agents to learn from it and to adapt
the next one. Our approach uses different concepts of game
theory like minority and stochastic games creating a new and
difficult to analyze scenario, thus more prone to be studied
through simulation. In a previous paper, we interfaced a JADE
implementation with a physical smart meter installed in a
home, in order to investigate the feasibility of an agent-based
approach [2].
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief
description of previous related work, while the description of
the proposed agent architecture follows (Section III), along
with with the proposed game theoretic approach (Section IV).
We then provide in Section V a detailed description of the
performed simulations involved in proving the efficiency of
the proposed models and strategies. Concluding comments and
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remarks follow in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory is a well established field with a vast literature.
More details about the rigorous formulation of the game
theory problem, definitions and notations commonly used
in this work can be found in Layton-Brown and Shoham
work [3]. For retrieving deeper knowledge on repeated games,
see for instance [4], while the reference example of minority
game used in solving the presented problem has been already
investigated in [5], [6]. The following sections will make
clearer to the reader how the work about the “El Farol Bar”
minority game problem is strictly connected to our approach
in finding equilibria. Insights of these notions combined to
multi agent systems and their applications (e.g: negotiation
techniques, auctions, ...) are excellently explained in many
other books: [7] is a very famous example on the topic. Game
theory and energy related issues together are not completely
new: in [8] Ramchurn et al. describe a decentralized agent
approach for avoiding energy consumption peaks, achieving
less polluting emissions and average lower contract prices
using all the features a Smart Meter can offer. In order to
evaluate and forecast the percentage of Smart Meter users in
the net, they used some concepts of evolutionary game theory.
Vytelingum et al. in [9] used the game theoretic approach in
order to find the Nash equilibria to determine when an agent
inserted in a Smart Grid is supposed to use a previously stored
amount of energy or to obtain electricity from the grid. On
the other hand, our solution relies on the fact the buffering
and/or storing electric energy is difficult and expensive to
achieve, and it hardly fits the short-term approach to the
market. Fuzzy logic and negotiation is also a recurrent topic
in previous researches [10]: in a way not so different from
our approach, it is used to help agents to adapt to the ever
changing conditions of the e-market. Also, in Jia-Hai et al. a
fuzzy logic approach was used to describe their model for the
decentralized market [11]. This latter work is well completed
with the addition of several reinforced learning techniques and
the benefits for the usage of the game theoretic approach is
seen as computationally intractable. In our work we want to
use different approaches to prove that a model with mixed
point of view can indeed provide satisfactory results.
III. AGENT ARCHITECTURE
An agent-based architecture can be used to describe an
energy market scenario with a large number of energy buyers,
a small set of prosumers (energy consumers and producers
using renewable energy sources), and an even lower number
of big electricity suppliers (Gencos). Those entities interact
with each other during several short-term negotiation rounds
in which the purpose for the sellers is to sell energy contracts,
while consumers have to obtain an energy contract as cheap
as possible. Each participant in the market can therefore be
represented by a software agent, and the negotiation mech-
anism is the auction (apart from Genco’s fixed price). Three
different kinds of agents are involved in the negotiation: Buyer,
Prosumer and Genco, while a fourth kind, Balancer Agent, is
not involved in the negotiation, but it helps in synchronizing
operations and in load balancing duties. Let us consider each
one individually.
Buyers are energy consumers; they do not produce energy
so they are searching for electricity by stipulating contracts
related to a specific time interval. Each market day is divided
into several time intervals and for each one every buyer has to
decide in advance who is going to be its energy supplier for the
next time interval. In the developed software simulation, every
day is composed of six time intervals and a balancer agent
to a certain extent controls the amount of energy exchanged
in the negotiation process (the details are explained later
in this section). Buyers can predict how much energy they
need for the following time interval. This can be obtained
by reading previous electric measurement and by applying
an energy consumption forecasting algorithm. It is important
to perform this forecast before any negotiation, so that the
buyer can choose the most suitable seller according to the
energy availability of the available suppliers. A really effective
forecasting algorithm that fits our short-term paradigm is
thoroughly described in [12] and it is based on an adaptive
two-stage hybrid network with a Self-Organized Map (SOM).
Every buyer is in competition with other buyers: each con-
sumer has the goal to stipulate the cheapest contracts by either
winning an auction handled by prosumers or by choosing the
right time to stipulate a contract with the cheapest Genco.
While these actions clearly underline a competition between
agents, adaptation techniques will be performed at the end of
every negotiation round in order to follow the possible market
variations over time (i.e. price fluctuations).
Prosumers produce and consume energy; they produce a
smaller quantity of electricity compared to Gencos by using
renewable sources of energy. If the amount of energy is more
than what they consume in a given time interval, they may
decide to sell surplus electricity to other neighbors (buyers).
Prosumers have also information about weather conditions in
order to have a forecast on the amount of energy that will
be produced (an example on how to automatically retrieve
weather forecasting information is by using existing web
services).
Prosumer hypotheses:
• A buyer can stipulate a contract with a prosumer after
winning an auction round, based on sealed bids; every
buyer sends different offers to a suitable prosumer (Dutch
auction)a
• Once the investment in a small-scale energy produc-
tion plant based on renewables is realized, any positive
amount derived by selling energy contributes to the
aActually, in the literature there are different definitions of the Dutch
auction. In this article with “Dutch auction” we mean an auction system in
which sealed bids are sent to the seller: buyers do not know any bid values
of the other consumers.
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investment return. Therefore in order to be attractive, pro-
sumers’ starting prices can be considered as substantially
lower than Gencos’ initial contract prices.
• Weather conditions during an observed interval can pre-
vent a prosumer to generate enough electricity to be sold.
• Prosumers communicate to buyers an initial starting price
that is influenced by contracts with energy Transmission
System Operators (TSO) and Distribution System Oper-
ators (DSO) and a random cost due to the devices used
to produce electricity (e.g., maintenance costs).
• The energy produced by a prosumer has to be sold and
cannot be stored or buffered.
Every prosumer is in direct competition with other sellers:
they have to propose an appealing starting price and make an
intelligent use of refusing bids in order to rise the price and,
at the same time, avoid pushing buyers in contacting other
sellers.
Gencos are big energy generating companies. They have a
theoretically infinite amount of energy supply, but sold at a
fixed price, so there is no auction negotiation and every con-
tract can be stipulated much faster compared to the prosumers’
auction system.
Genco hypotheses:
• Gencos prices are higher than prosumers’ starting price.
• Gencos prices depend on TSO/DSO contracts, raw mate-
rial price and (most important in our scenario) threshold
exceeding costs. This aspect is thoroughly explained in
the following paragraph.
• A Genco receives a request from a buyer; then it just
calculates the price according to the above-explained
variables and communicates the final price back to the
buyer.
Gencos threshold system: A key point is how much energy
a generating company can produce without having to buy some
of it on the market (e.g., a foreign and more expensive market).
So we assume that every Genco has a supply threshold, and
once reached, the Genco has to buy energy abroad (the energy
production of that seller is under stress). So the energy cost
can be calculated as follows:
Cu =
{
Costenergy if below supply threshold
Costenergy + (EC ×A) if above supply threshold
where Cu is a single energy unit cost, EC > 1 is an external
cost constant and A > 0 is number of energy units above the
threshold.
Surpassing the threshold might also be harmful for the
environment since more polluting plants might be started (e.g.,
oil based). Asking the Genco for contracts when this threshold
is already surpassed leads to more expensive contract prices.
Those prices rise as we get further from the specified thresh-
old. This particular pricing strategy already introduced in [2]
is perfectly compliant with the findings of other researches:
from the already cited [8] and [9] to older studies led by
Brazier et al in [13]. These researches do not provide the
Figure 1. U.S. Nationwide energy dispatch without (a) and with (b) renewable
contributions. Source [14]
same formulation, however the common conclusion is that
higher satisfied demands will stress energy production lines
introducing additional costs for the final user.
General hypotheses:
• A balancer agent keeps track of how much energy
prosumers can supply; subtracting this amount from the
total energy demand in an observed area should give
an idea about the quantity of energy that Gencos have
to produce. Dividing this quantity by the number of
functioning Gencos gives an advice on how many energy
units every Genco is supposed to produce in order to not
generate more energy than needed.
• Even in this case, storing or buffering energy is not a
viable solution.
• The threshold is calculated according to the demand
forecasts. It also depends on the maximum capacity for
Genco’s energy production lines.
The Balancer agent is responsible for the synchronization
of negotiation procedures and for the balancing aspects: it acts
in the very first step of the negotiation round by retrieving the
single demand of every consumer and the production forecasts
of the prosumers. Since producing more energy than needed
is not convenient to anyone, agents here are collaborating
to avoid useless energy production; this can be obtained by
notifying the Gencos about a suggested amount of energy they
should produce taking into account the previously introduced
notions of demand and prosumer supplies. Recent studies [14]
have shown how the nationwide energy dispatch will react to
the introduction of renewable sources; in particular, the energy
production derived from traditional sources will decrease: in
the U.S.A a future projection of four summer days in year
2030 is depicted in figure 1 and shows two scenarios, with and
without solar penetration and how their percentage of produced
energy compares to traditional sources. The demand satisfied
by the total production from all sources remains constant in
these two scenarios; however, in (b) we can see how the
introduction of PV and CSPs (respectively PhotoVoltaic and
Concentrating Solar Power plants) will cause decreasing in
production by all the traditional suppliers.
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The data in figure 1 refers to GridViewb production cost
model, with hourly load, solar and wind projections for 2030
based on 2006 information to maintain data correlation. On
a separate note, it is important to point out in figure 1 that
solar plants have production peaks during central hours of the
examined days.
IV. ADAPTIVE AGENT NEGOTIATION
The provisioning and selling of energy can be modeled as
a game in which each agent’s goal is to make an economic
profit. A round of the game is the negotiation of energy during
one time interval in which each market participant (in our case
software agents acting on behalf of human users) may have a
certain probability to win or lose, according to the retrieved
payoff at the end of the specified round. An agent is winning
when it manages to obtain an energy contract at the lowest
price possible. This situation implies that agents are rational.
In this context, reaching a Nash equilibrium [15] means that
we have found the right strategy (or the combination of
mixed strategies) that each agent does not want to change,
independently of which strategies other agents have chosen.
We now may want to start from an already proposed game
theoretic scenario and then adapt it to fit our needs.
A. El Farol Bar game
“El Farol Bar” is an existing bar situated somewhere in New
Mexico (USA). Every Thursday night it delivers Irish parties
with discounted beer prices, becoming really appetizing for the
local potential costumers. Every person living near that bar,
wants to go there on that particular night. The bar has been
used to model the El Farol Bar minority game [5], [6] in the
following way. Given N as the population in the nearby area,
and a threshold T of people attending the Irish night event,
the night at the bar is considered as enjoyable if the number n
(≤ N) of participants during a particular Thursday is below
the threshold T (win situation). Otherwise, it is better for the
single person to remain at home (lose situation, the pub is too
crowded). That is why it is called a minority game: we have
two different behaviors and a single agent can win if it chooses
the path taken by the minority of the population (Table I).
The similarity with our problem is given by such two-paths
way of thinking: if every agent contacts Gencos, it results in
overloading the production lines of these big energy producers,
causing them to provision in more expensive markets with high
prices for the end-user and environmental issues too. Likewise,
if every agent contacts (or tries to do so) the same restricted
set of prosumers, only a few number of participant gets a
nice deal, due to the fact that a prosumer can deliver a little
amount of energy, especially compared to a Genco. In addition,
in the bar game participants are competitive and they are not
able to communicate with each other, so they cannot organize
themselves in order to create some sort of shift, in which they
can split and choose (for a fraction of them) not to go on this
bhttp://www.abb.com/industries/
TABLE I
EL FAROL BAR PAYOFF MATRIX
Action Crowded Bar not Crowded Bar
Attend L H
Do not Attend M M
With payoff score H > M > L, with M unconditioned.
Thursday, but go to the next one instead. There are similarities
also here: energy bidding agents cannot communicate in this
way, and they have to guess how other buyers are going to act.
In the bar dilemma, there are different payoffs according to the
result of each game round: a participant gets the highest score
by going to the bar and he discovers that it is not crowded.
He gets a medium amount of points if he chooses to stay
home, and he gets a penalty (or the minimum score) in case
he chooses to attend the Irish night and finds it crowded. In our
problem, this score system can be replaced by the difference
between what a single agent expected to spend and what it
actually spends at the end of the negotiation interval.
A simple way to find an equilibrium for the El Farol
Bar game has been proposed originally in [5]. We begin
by illustrating this first intuitive approach. According to the
demonstration in [5] there is a unique symmetrical mixed
strategy solution:
M − L








Where p is the probability to go at the bar and M , L and H
the payoffs as shown in Table I.
Following studies (i.e., [6]) have shown other solutions,
which are classified according to fairness and efficiency
measures. Here we propose a variant meeting the fairness
requirement and having an average efficiency, since we do
not want to compromise the fairness of the market (it would
be illegal to give privileges to some buyers, penalizing others).
In particular, the other proposed solutions suggest the use of
fictitious play agents in order to reach a more efficient average
outcome over a sacrificed fairness. An approach that has both
fairness and efficiency requirements satisfied, is represented
by a Q-Learning strategy in which a central authority (e.g.,
a major) introduces entrance fees for customers attending the
bar to be distributed to the players who are at home. Even
this last solution is not in line with our problem since we are
describing a decentralized approach. Using the equation 1, we
can see that for each participant we have a given probability
that can be used to decide whether it is advisable to attend
the Irish night. Repeating the game we can see that every
agent sooner or later will attend the bar and that most of
the times, the pub will not be so crowded. When trying to
apply the solution shown in the equation 1 to our energy
problem, we map some variables as follows: T for the ratio
between the amounts of energy produced by Prosumers over
the Gencos, N is the total number of buyer agents and M , H
and L are intervals defined according to the expected/actual
money spent. A difference between the bar game and our
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Let I be a set of agents representing the consumers;
P be the set of prosumers, while G represents the
Gencos;
Players ∈ I move through different tables shaping the
finite state space M = {m0, m1, m2, m3}.
m0: initial state in which the agent i ∈ I decides who
is going to first contact. It can be a Genco or a specific
Prosumer P0 ∈ P.
m1: second state in which i decides who will be con-
tacted next, provided that D(i) > S(P0) with D being the
consumer demand and S is the seller’s supply capacity.
m2: here i decides if it is convenient to place a bid to
a previously contacted prosumer Px ∈ P or abort the
negotiation, provided that D(i) ≤ S(P0).
m3: i decides to accept or not the offer of a specified
Genco Gx ∈ G.
Therefore each player (agent) i ∈ I can perform an
action inside the set(s):
Ai(m0) = Ai(m1) = {Contact Genco, Contact Pro-
sumer};
Ai(m2) = {Place bid, Abort Negotiation};
Ai(m3) = {Accept offer, Refuse offer}.
The probability P to move from the current state mx to
next state (my) after performing a specific action a ∈ A,
written P (mx,a,my) is described in Tables II, III, IV
and V with their assigned payoff chains.
Figure 2. Game formalization.
energy market is that in the bar game if a number m of
people are attending the bar with m > T then m players are
losing. In our problem just T −m people are actually going to
retrieve a low payoff. This initial model still lacks of influential
variables like time constraints and limited prosumers’ supplies,
implying the necessity of adding further stages to our game.
We now present an approach in which several tables represent
different payoff matrices for all the stages forming the game.
This new methodology that mixes the minority game approach
with a stochastic game (every payoff table refers to a specific
participant’s state) is used in order to model the complexity of
the energy problem. The main idea behind the adaptation of
the game we propose is presented more formally in Figure 2.
It is an infinite game split into finite rounds. The decision
each agent takes at every state is compactly represented in the
following payoff tables.
Tables II and III are called initial state tables while Ta-
bles IV and V are defined as final state tables. The difference
is that only Tables IV and V show an ending of the negotiation,
represented by the letters H , M or L as the payoff entity inside
those cells.
Every buyer starts by taking a decision in the first table
(referring to an element of the state space M). The balancer
agent is the entity that knows how much energy can be
produced by all the prosumers and by using this information
TABLE II
INITIAL STATE 1 (TAB1)
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact Pros. See TAB3 (+2 Ip) See TAB2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See TAB4 (+1 Ip) See TAB4 (+1 Ip)
TABLE III
INITIAL STATE 2 (TAB2)
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact other P. See TAB3 (+2 Ip) See TAB2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See TAB4 (+1 Ip) See TAB4 (+1 Ip)
it can calculate the number of buyers that could be served by
prosumers; this number can be related to the threshold T in the
El Farol game. According to that threshold we can calculate
the probability to contact prosumers instead of a Genco in
this stage of the negotiation (quite similar to how it was
possible to solve the “El Farol Bar” dilemma using the unique
mixed strategy solution). However, at this moment we do not
have a clear vision of future payoffs, but we can assign to
those initial tables a certain amount of fictional points that we
call “Intermediate points” (Ips). Those Ips represent the chain
of payoffs for the stochastic game approach: assuming that
every action taken by a participant agent is time consuming,
decreasing Ips simulates time flow as well as a risk increase
that the participating agent should be aware of. Risk awareness
in auction bidding systems has already been studied [16];
although the concept of risk is elaborated in a different kind
of market model, a risk-aware agent better simulates how a
human user would act. On the other side, higher Ips increase
the chance to have a satisfactory game result (H or M final
payoff). In this way the buyer is redirected to other tables until
it reaches a final cell: doing so the number of Ips can increase
in case it is a lucky choice (contacting a prosumer that for sure
has enough supplies) or decrease in the opposite scenario. In
the initial state tables the buyer is redirected to other tables
according to a previously calculated value that is related to
the amount of energy all prosumers can produce. In the final
state tables the algorithm is different: in order to simulate the
importance of the time variable, lower Ip values mean that the
buyer has been traveling around different tables for such a long
time and chances to find a suitable seller or even a Genco that
has not overtaken its threshold will be scarce. That is because
TABLE IV
FINAL STATE 3 (TAB3)
Action Pros. accepts Pros. refuses
Place bid H Stay in TAB3 (-1 Ip)
Abort negotiation See TAB2 See TAB2 (0 Ip)
TABLE V
FINAL STATE 4 (TAB4)
Action Genco above T. Genco below T.
Accept genco’s offer M L
Refuse genco’s offer See TAB2 (-1 Ip) See TAB2 (-1 Ip)
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in the ending tables negative values are present. When the Ip
value is very small (<< 0) then the agent is forced to get a
contract with a Genco in order to avoid wasting other time
(and consequently other money). At the end of each round,
each buyer agent evaluates its outcome. Above we said that the
difference between the expected money spent and the actual
money spent can point out who are the winners and who are
the losers, but the situation is more complex. Let us consider
for example a buyer agent ending a negotiation round having
obtained an H (high) payoff: how can our system verify that
this supposedly high utility gained corresponds to a cheap
contract? As long as the money spent is equal to the desired
agent budget the answer will be positive, but this case has to be
applicable to a very dynamic scenario in which market prices
(i.e: raw material, introduction of new TSO/DSO competitors)
can constantly change over time. If an H payoff corresponds to
an amount of actual money spent significantly higher (lower)
then the budget, it means that, according to the market, the
agent was expecting an unrealistically low (high) price for
energy unit. Here lies the need for finding an adaptation
method for calibrating bids and budgets according to the price
swings of the real market. In Section IV-B, a fuzzy logic
approach will be described. Those kinds of logics are recurrent
in negotiating strategies since they are able to model factors
not only related to human behavior (like the seller patience
factor in [10]) but also for balancing and distribution [11].
B. Adaptation from Previous Bids
Agents should improve their performance as they act in
the market. Therefore, they should adapt to the market trends
and also to the way other agents are performing. Each buyer
initially has the following variable parameters that are subject
to change during the subsequent rounds:
• An expected amount of money he desires to spend for
an energy unit;
• A certain number of refuses to receive before deciding
to change seller; and
• A certain amount of money representing the rising of the
stake after each bidding refusal.
While each prosumer has:
• An amount of money he desires to earn after a negotia-
tion; and
• A certain number of refuses to give if the buyer bids are
lower than the expected gain.
Every buyer sends a sealed bid to the prosumer. The
prosumer therefore checks for the highest bid and refuses
everything else; then if the highest bid is satisfying, it may
decide to accept the contract, otherwise it refuses also the
highest bid and waits for every buyer to send it other sealed
bids that will be higher than the previous ones, in an iterative
process. A certain buyer has a limited amount of times in
which it sends offers, after which the stakes are too high so
that it will consider other sellers. From the buyer’s point of
Figure 3. Controlling bids diagram. Buyer’s side: 1) Increase expected money
to spend, 2) Rising stakes/bids, 3) Decrease Rise stakes/bid, 4) Decrease
expected money to spend.
view, we need an adaptation strategy that can adjust its variable
parameters in order to succeed in this auction bidding system.
The more its spends, the stronger will be the autonomous
reaction that will influence the variable parameters in order to
contrast the unwanted trend (a graphic representation is given
in Figure 3).
The graph depicted in Figure 3 is centered in the expected
money to spend. If the spent money is surpassing the right
interval, then the system reacts by slowly rising the stake of
every single bid and increasing the spending expectations. On
the other side, if the value for money spent is located in the left
side of the graph, the reactions will be the contrary compared
to the last situation: this is done in order to adjust expectations
in the case of lowering of market’s prices for electricity.
In summary, the strategy of the buyer is captured by the
following four steps.
1) Before the negotiation, according to prosumers’ pro-
duction threshold, every buyer starting from the first
initial table immediately decides to contact a Genco or a
prosumer.
2) The buyer follows every needed redirection across the
four strategy tables. Every choice depends on how many
intermediate points the single buyer has accumulated.
3) After the negotiation, if the buyer has a supposed large
number of Ips, but still it ended up in a M or L cell and
its money expectation are not met, then the agent has to
learn from that, changing the way the buyer travels across
the tables according to the Ips.
4) The examined agent applies the mathematical functions
that we can extract from the fuzzy styled control system
graph shown in Figure 3.
V. SIMULATION
We developed a simulation environment featuring 100 buyer
participants, 10 prosumers and 5 Gencos over 400 negotiation
rounds. The goal of this simulation is to test efficiency, that
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is, a measure of collective agent utility achieved relative to
its maximum value [6]. Specific to our case, the utility is
represented by the money spent. Therefore we should adjust
the previous definition by pointing out that the sum of money
spent by a single agent is compared to the minimum average
energy contract price calculated in all the examined rounds.
The simulation was executed on a computer with AMD Athlon
II Dual Core M300 2 GHz processor with 6 GB RAM running
a Windows 7 64 bit edition operating systems and a Java
virtual machine environment JAVA SE 6 Update 21 [17].
Several parameters can be adjusted influencing the final
strategy, namely: (1) the number of Ips used as threshold in
order to redirect the participant from one final table to the
other; (2) the difference between starting prices for the two
kinds of sellers; (3) all the unspecified values in Figure 3 that
represent ranges in which different reactions are applied in
order to change the agent’s stake entity and/or its expected
price; (4) the best way to assign values to H , M and L
final payoffs; (5) the price dynamics from one round to the
other; (6) the Gencos’ price penalties for exceeding thresholds;
(7) the probability for a prosumer to become more expensive
than a Genco; and (8) the accuracy about energy supply and
demand forecasting that might not be 100% correct.
The best way to give precise values to these parameters is to
study an analytical formulation in which we can combine all
other known values (e.g., number of participants and amount
of demands and supplies) in order to retrieve the unknown
data. However, we decided to use a numerical approach
instead, by trying several value combinations of every input
variables of the algorithm. This is due to the complexity of
the whole examined scenario as well as its potential to be
extremely dynamic (e.g: price, agents number and demand
can vary from one round to another).
At the end of each round, the program calculates the average
expecting budget and the average money spent, assigning to
each round number those other two values (e.g., round #,
Paid Price, Expected Price). In order to have a clearer idea
of the efficiency and precision of the strategy, we show the
difference between applying the market strategy or adopt a
baseline behaviour. In the latter scenario, every buyer will
contact a prosumer straightaway and after signing a contract,
the participant skips the adaptation phase described previously.
We obtain the results shown in Figure 4, under the following
conditions: (1) intersection between average starting prices
of the sellers should not exceed 33%; (2) slow and not
exaggerated price swings between each round; (3) significant
price penalties for exceeding Gencos’ threshold; (4) the higher
the error percentage between the forecast demand values and
the actual requested values (negative error), the better becomes
the improvement between using the adaptation strategy com-
pared to the baseline scenario. Positive errors may worsen
participant performances; and (5) very fast reaction to follow
the expected price: the intervals shown in Figure 3 should have
a very small size. The conditions (1) and (3) force the gap
between the prices to be wide enough to justify the minority
game approach, while (2) and (5) deal with the difficulty
of the algorithm in finding equilibria in exaggerate dynamic
scenarios. Finally, (4) is straightforward.
In the simulation, the expected price starts from 0 in the
first round, and the convergence between the expected price
and the paid price starts in the range of 11th-21st round.
Economically speaking it means that in earlier rounds a buyer
agent adopting the algorithm with the described strategies is
likely to pay equally or slightly more than an agent following
other strategies. However, if we consider a sufficiently large
number of rounds, the saving is guaranteed compared to agents
that always choose the strategy that immediately appears as the
most convenient (Figure 4). The test was executed having a
constant numbers of agents, although sellers’ supply capacity
was subject to randomized swings from one round to the
other. Therefore, changing sellers’ number does not drastically
affect the presented results, provided that this number does
not exaggeratedly and unrealistically change in a short period
of time. In a more complex scenario in which sellers adopt
strategies according to the economic background, the presence
of different market competitors will determine an additional
factor that needs to be further investigated in order to provide
a more realistic model.
Computationally wise, the complexity of the presented
algorithm is variable but does not appear to represent a
problem. While the balancer agent has the duty to solve the
equation 1, buyer agents just have to solve an iterated amount
of conditional instruction and comparing variables (e.g: if
current Ip value is greater than the threshold value then execute
action A, otherwise jump to action B). The fuzzy logic block
is just composed of a mixed set of linear functions and it is
executed just once at the end of the negotiating round. On
a separate note about the architecture itself, further tests and
improvements on performances (also in a distributed net) are
considered in [18].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented an agent-based approach
for deregulated energy markets, focusing on negotiation and
adaptation strategies that have their root in game theory.
Specifically, we exploited the concept of minority game to
provide a better distribution of the available resources, and
we used a stochastic game design to simulate time flow
and risk variation through an accurate intermediate payoff
accumulation during the same negotiating round. We have
implemented a simulation of the system to test its efficiency
and to evaluate the behavior over multiple rounds, on the base
of a previous experience with physical smart meters connected
to user homes [2]. The results show that this approach reflects
real market scenarios as well as the proof that agents that adopt
the adaptive strategy have better chances to stipulate cheaper
contracts on average. As shown in the graph in Figure 4,
the gap between the two situations (i.e., agents following the
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Figure 4. Three functions showing the difference between no learning prices and the chasing of expected prices with obtained average deals when using the
explained strategy.
adaptive strategy and agents always contacting cheaper sellers
first) is remarkable when certain conditions are satisfied. In
addition to that, we can see how expected prices, starting from
very low (and impossible to obtain) values tend to reach an
equilibrated amount that represents the cheapest alternative
in almost all the examined negotiation rounds. The prices
obtained with the proposed strategy follow really close that
value. Opportunistic agents that always try to win prosumers’
auction may have some chance to win during the initial rounds,
but still the algorithm provided tries to establish a Nash
equilibrium nonetheless; once the prices are balanced, chances
to obtain the best bargain are going to be sporadic for those
agents. This strategy and these simulations help to prove that a
fully deregulated market with an appropriate tax and incentive
policies should help the introduction of small energy producers
(based on renewable sources) able to fulfill the needs of
their neighborhood. This will allow buyers to choose between
different sellers with different prices, with the consequence
that average contract costs will stabilize to a slightly swinging
value but still towards a convergence to a value that is
supposed to take place in middle of prosumers’ starting price
and Gencos’ fixed price (when their production stays below
their threshold). This convergence applied to similar dynamic
and variegated scenarios has already been studied in earlier
works [19]. We leave open for future investigation a more
formal description of the model taking into account all the
necessary variables (participants number, Ips state changing
triggering values, fuzzy function values etc.) to consolidate
the simulation results presented here. This includes the study
of the existence of equilibria in such dynamic and complex
scenarios and also additional comparative evaluations with
other possible market models are needed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work is partially supported by the ASCENS project
(EU FP7-FET, Contract No. 257414)
REFERENCES
[1] H. Zhu, M. Hou, and M. Zhou, “Establishing the foundation of adap-
tive collaboration,” in Symposium on Collaborative Technologies and
Systems (CTS),, ser. CTS. IEEE, 2010.
[2] N. Capodieci, G. A. Pagani, G. Cabri, and M. Aiello, “Smart meter aware
domestic energy trading agents,” in Proceedings of the 2011 workshop
on E-energy market challenge, ser. IEEMC ’11. ACM, 2011, pp. 1–10.
[3] K. Leyton-Brown and Y. Shoham, Eds., Essentials of game theory: a
concise, multidisciplinary introduction. A Publication in the Morgan
and Claypool Publishers series, 2008.
[4] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Eds., Algo-
rithmic Game Theory. Cambridge Uni. Press, 2007.
[5] D. Whitehead, “The El Farol bar problem revisited: Reinforcement
learning in a potential game,” ESE Discussion Papers 186 Edinburgh
School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, Tech. Rep., 2008.
[6] J. Farago, A. Greenwald, and K. Hall, “Fair and efficient solutions to the
Santa Fe Bar problem,” in Proceedings of Grace Hopper: Celebration
of Women in Computing, . 2002.
[7] Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown, Eds., Multiagent systems: algorithmic,
game-theoretic and logical foundations. Cambridge Uni. Press, 2009.
[8] S. Ramchurn, P. Vytelingum, A. Rogers, and N. Jennings, “Agent-based
control for decentralised demand side management in the smart grid,” in
10th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2011), 2011, pp. 5–12.
[9] P. Vytelingum, T. Voice, S. Ramchurn, A. Rogers, and N. Jennings,
“Agent-based micro-storage management for the smart grid,” in 9th Int.
Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010),
2010.
[10] Kolomvatsos, Anagnostopoulos, and Hadjiefthymiades, “On the use of
fuzzy logic in a seller bargaining game,” in Computer Software and
Applications, 2008. COMPSAC ’08., 2008, pp. 184–191.
[11] Y. Jia-hai, Y. Shun-kun, and H. Zhao-guang, “A multi-agent trading
platform for electricity contract market,” Power Engineering Conference
2005. IPEC 2005. The 7th International, vol. Singapore, Nov/Dec 2005.
[12] S. Fan and L. Chen, “Short-term load forecasting based on an adaptive
hybrid method,” Osaka Sangyo University, June 2005.
[13] F. Brazier, F. Cornelissena, R. Gustavsson, C. Jonker, O. Lindeberg,
B. Polaka, and J. Treur, “A multi-agent system performing one-to-many
negotiation for load balancing of electricity use,” Electronic Commerce
Research and Applications, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 208–224, 2002.
[14] Brinkman, Denholm, Drury, Margolis, and Mowers, “Toward a solar-
powered grid,” Power and Energy Magazine, IEEE, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.
24–32, 2011.
[15] A. Rapoport and A. M. Chammah, Prisoner’s dilemma. Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1965.
[16] V. Robu and H. L. Poutre´, “Designing bidding strategies in sequential
auctions for risk averse agents,” In Proc. of AMEC07, 2007.
[17] N. Capodieci, “P2P energy exchange agent platform featuring a
game theory related learning negotiation algorithm,” Master’s the-
sis, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, 2011, available at
http://www.cs.rug.nl/ aiellom/tesi/capodieci.pdf.
[18] M. Koster, “Reliable Multi-agent System for a large scale distributed
energy trading network,” Master’s thesis, University of Groningen, 2011,
available at http://www.cs.rug.nl/ aiellom/tesi/koster.pdf.
[19] T. Jamasb and M. Pollitt, “Electricity market reform in the european
union: review of progress towards liberalisation and integration,” MIT.
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Tech. Rep. MIT-
CEEPR (Series) ; 05-003WP, 2005.
307
